Developing close relations with Japan was from the start a priority task for independent India. Ties were badly damaged by the War but after hostilities ended India began to shape a vision of Asian solidarity that required early restoration of ties with Japan; the discredited imperial and colonial powers were on the way out and a new dispensation for Asia was in the making. Nehru’s India took some imaginative steps in this direction, one of the most striking being refusal to demand war reparations from Japan, unlike other combatant nations which extracted what they could from the prostrate Japanese empire. This important gesture elicited a warm response, and to symbolize the new era Japan made a handsome gift to India of a fine house in a choice quarter of Tokyo to serve as the official residence of the newly appointed Ambassador. This remains the Indian Embassy even today, and as Japan restored its fortunes and property values in Tokyo went through the ceiling, that early gift has become immensely valuable.

The India-Japan relationship remained warm through the vagaries of the Cold War even though they did not share much common ground at the time of the successive Asian wars in Korea and, later, Vietnam. The Japanese economic resurgence continued apace and  transformed that country, with Japan emerging as a principal donor of development assistance to Asia, which role became particularly significant when the Japan-driven Asian Development Bank became operational in 1966. Japan was deliberatively low-key in regional affairs but its influence as an economic power kept growing, which made it an important donor and development partner for India.

Thus a pattern of cooperation between the two countries became reasonably well established, with seemingly little to hinder further advance. However, India and Japan were never on all fours in the matter of nuclear disarmament, which on several occasions was to become a problem area in their relationship. Japan, having been the victim of nuclear attack, is extremely sensitive in this matter and is one of the strongest proponents for complete nuclear disarmament. India, while strongly supportive of disarmament and steadfastly opposed to proliferation, has had very different security issues to contend with and could not ignore the development of nuclear weapons by countries in its region or the nuclearization of the surrounding ocean.

An important turning point was India’s PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Experiment) of 1974 which had a fallout on India-Japan relations and reduced bilateral economic cooperation. The economic impact on India of the consequent slowdown was limited but there was considerable distancing between the two countries as a result of this event. Even before PNE the nuclear issue had been a source of divergence, most conspicuously on the matter of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which Japan actively promoted but from which India and some other countries kept away when it was adopted in 1968. The treaty had features that India could not accept, and New Delhi had to resist a great deal of international pressure, especially by the nuclear powers, while holding out for a more balanced agreement.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 is another major international instrument that shed further light on India-Japan differences on nuclear matters. India entered into negotiations on the draft treaty when it was first proposed in the expectation that it would be able to maintain its well-known position on the NPT while playing its part in the international effort to bring an end to nuclear testing. However, other countries, the P-5 prominent among them, sought an agreement with features that magnified the inequities that had kept India out of the NPT in the first instance. India therefore felt unable to join the CTBT, for which it had to face obloquy and endure sanctions. The gap between India and Japan on this issue thereafter widened even though the overall relationship remained friendly.

Bridging the gap became feasible only after the India-US nuclear deal of 2005 which substantially affirmed India’s credentials as a responsible nuclear power and acted as a signpost to others. It opened the way for India to acquire nuclear plant and equipment for its electric power needs from the most capable manufacturers worldwide, enabling it to diversify beyond its earlier suppliers that were mainly indigenous or of Russian provenance. Meanwhile, the global nuclear industry had itself undergone a considerable shakeout, with mergers and amalgamations that reduced the number of potential suppliers at a time when global concerns about pollution were on the rise and sentiment in favour of nuclear energy as a pollution-free source were strengthening.

It was thus a complex set of issues that came into play when PM Modi paid on official visit to Japan a few days ago. In addition to nuclear matters, he had to address questions relating to the overall security architecture for Asia, a subject on which there has been considerable discussion recently. The big global and regional powers have developed sometimes contradictory views about Asia’s future, so this is a good time for India and Japan to exchange ideas, for they share many common values and can benefit from strengthened mutual understanding. It was thus useful for Modi to have met his Japanese counterpart Abe at this juncture, the more so as they have already met on several recent occasions and have developed good personal ties. These are two masterful figures with long term ambitions that go well beyond retaining their positions until the next elections, and both are leaders who are looking for reform and far-reaching change.

As the joint statement after Modi’s visit showed, the two leaders were able to project a strong shared view on international terrorism, which is a prime current concern for India. They also expressed their views on the CTBT where the joint statement suggests that while there was shared ground between them, the meeting of minds was not all-inclusive: senior officials from the two sides had somewhat different interpretations of what could be the consequences should India decide to test a nuclear device. This is no more than a remote contingency today, and if there were any difference in interpretation of the relevant portion of the joint statement, this has little practical significance, for India has eschewed further testing while Japan has never taken that course.

The Japanese spokesman reiterated his government’s position that a nuclear explosion by India would invalidate the bilateral agreement though his Indian counterpart

gave a more nuanced account. Such exchanges by spokespersons amount to statements of principle and do not indicate any sort of imminent developments, and therefore should not be permitted to detract from a successful visit by Modi.

 — Salman Haidar

The writer is India’s former Foreign Secretary.