Developing
close relations with Japan was from the start a priority task for independent
India. Ties were badly damaged by the War but after hostilities ended India
began to shape a vision of Asian solidarity that required early restoration of
ties with Japan; the discredited imperial and colonial powers were on the way
out and a new dispensation for Asia was in the making. Nehru’s India took some
imaginative steps in this direction, one of the most striking being refusal to
demand war reparations from Japan, unlike other combatant nations which
extracted what they could from the prostrate Japanese empire. This important
gesture elicited a warm response, and to symbolize the new era Japan made a
handsome gift to India of a fine house in a choice quarter of Tokyo to serve as
the official residence of the newly appointed Ambassador. This remains the
Indian Embassy even today, and as Japan restored its fortunes and property
values in Tokyo went through the ceiling, that early gift has become immensely
valuable.

The
India-Japan relationship remained warm through the vagaries of the Cold War
even though they did not share much common ground at the time of the successive
Asian wars in Korea and, later, Vietnam. The Japanese economic resurgence
continued apace and  transformed that
country, with Japan emerging as a principal donor of development assistance to
Asia, which role became particularly significant when the Japan-driven Asian
Development Bank became operational in 1966. Japan was deliberatively low-key
in regional affairs but its influence as an economic power kept growing, which
made it an important donor and development partner for India.

Thus
a pattern of cooperation between the two countries became reasonably well
established, with seemingly little to hinder further advance. However, India
and Japan were never on all fours in the matter of nuclear disarmament, which
on several occasions was to become a problem area in their relationship. Japan,
having been the victim of nuclear attack, is extremely sensitive in this matter
and is one of the strongest proponents for complete nuclear disarmament. India,
while strongly supportive of disarmament and steadfastly opposed to
proliferation, has had very different security issues to contend with and could
not ignore the development of nuclear weapons by countries in its region or the
nuclearization of the surrounding ocean.

An
important turning point was India’s PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Experiment) of 1974
which had a fallout on India-Japan relations and reduced bilateral economic
cooperation. The economic impact on India of the consequent slowdown was
limited but there was considerable distancing between the two countries as a
result of this event. Even before PNE the nuclear issue had been a source of
divergence, most conspicuously on the matter of the Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) which Japan actively promoted but from which India and some other
countries kept away when it was adopted in 1968. The treaty had features that
India could not accept, and New Delhi had to resist a great deal of
international pressure, especially by the nuclear powers, while holding out for
a more balanced agreement.

The
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 is another major international
instrument that shed further light on India-Japan differences on nuclear
matters. India entered into negotiations on the draft treaty when it was first
proposed in the expectation that it would be able to maintain its well-known
position on the NPT while playing its part in the international effort to bring
an end to nuclear testing. However, other countries, the P-5 prominent among
them, sought an agreement with features that magnified the inequities that had
kept India out of the NPT in the first instance. India therefore felt unable to
join the CTBT, for which it had to face obloquy and endure sanctions. The gap
between India and Japan on this issue thereafter widened even though the
overall relationship remained friendly.

Bridging
the gap became feasible only after the India-US nuclear deal of 2005 which
substantially affirmed India’s credentials as a responsible nuclear power and
acted as a signpost to others. It opened the way for India to acquire nuclear
plant and equipment for its electric power needs from the most capable
manufacturers worldwide, enabling it to diversify beyond its earlier suppliers
that were mainly indigenous or of Russian provenance. Meanwhile, the global
nuclear industry had itself undergone a considerable shakeout, with mergers and
amalgamations that reduced the number of potential suppliers at a time when
global concerns about pollution were on the rise and sentiment in favour of
nuclear energy as a pollution-free source were strengthening.

It
was thus a complex set of issues that came into play when PM Modi paid on
official visit to Japan a few days ago. In addition to nuclear matters, he had
to address questions relating to the overall security architecture for Asia, a
subject on which there has been considerable discussion recently. The big
global and regional powers have developed sometimes contradictory views about
Asia’s future, so this is a good time for India and Japan to exchange ideas,
for they share many common values and can benefit from strengthened mutual
understanding. It was thus useful for Modi to have met his Japanese counterpart
Abe at this juncture, the more so as they have already met on several recent
occasions and have developed good personal ties. These are two masterful
figures with long term ambitions that go well beyond retaining their positions
until the next elections, and both are leaders who are looking for reform and
far-reaching change.

As
the joint statement after Modi’s visit showed, the two leaders were able to
project a strong shared view on international terrorism, which is a prime current
concern for India. They also expressed their views on the CTBT where the joint
statement suggests that while there was shared ground between them, the meeting
of minds was not all-inclusive: senior officials from the two sides had
somewhat different interpretations of what could be the consequences should
India decide to test a nuclear device. This is no more than a remote
contingency today, and if there were any difference in interpretation of the
relevant portion of the joint statement, this has little practical
significance, for India has eschewed further testing while Japan has never
taken that course.

The
Japanese spokesman reiterated his government’s position that a nuclear
explosion by India would invalidate the bilateral agreement though his Indian
counterpart

gave
a more nuanced account. Such exchanges by spokespersons amount to statements of
principle and do not indicate any sort of imminent developments, and therefore
should not be permitted to detract from a successful visit by Modi.

 —
Salman Haidar

The
writer is India’s former Foreign Secretary.