Pompous statements issued by neutral nations, multinational fora and official spokespersons are usually intended to please all, and offend none. Diplomatic jargon is then cherry-picked by the contending parties/nations involved to crush and twist the statements to make them sound convenient and in support of the nationally-aligned positions and narratives that suit the political class of the opposing countries.

The United Nations, it has been remarked, has become the most expensive venue for meaningless debates that hardly resolve the contentious issue, and yet captures the imagination of the frenzied folk back home. From the marathon four-and-a-half hour diatribe by Fidel Castro during the plenary meeting of the General Assembly in 1960, Nikita Khrushchev&’s shoe-banging attack on the US, to the theatrical observation of the Iranian President Ahmadinejad that he could, “still smell sulphur” (as the podium was used by US President Bush, the day before), to Hugo Chavez calling President Bush, “the devil” – the epitome of international diplomacy and reconciliation has, over the years ,been reduced to an international venue, to address the audience back home. More recently, the track record of the UN in ushering in the necessary discussions and debates amongst representatives of the various member nations has been completely lacking. It is merely a high table to regurgitate the national positions and perspectives, irrespective of the outcome. Therefore, ‘bilateral’ engagements have emerged as the focused format to resolve disputes, away from the glitz and chicanery of the diplomatic endeavour.

The lack of clarity and deliberate ambiguity from the UN secretariat ensures a parallel invocation of the multiple UN clauses and sub-clauses to buttress their respective positions, by both India and Pakistan. The recent shadow-boxing at the UN following the Uri terror attack has a familiar ring of stated positions, with the Pakistan media reporting that the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had ‘successfully’ handed a dossier to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, containing photographic evidence of Kashmiri ‘victims’. It went on to state as how the UN chief had, “expressed shock at the photographs” and that Nawaz Sharif, “thanked the UN chief for his strong and supportive statements on the situation in Kashmir”.

The reportage in India was about how the UN chief had ‘snubbed’ Pakistan&’s repeated demand for UN intervention, and had instead suggested to the Pakistan Prime Minister to settle the outstanding issues through “dialogue”. A similar bout of responses emerges after every statement issued by the office of the Press Secretary at the White House.

Rarely is the diplomatic reaction in the nature of black-and-white plain-speak. It took the earthy ‘Texan’ in George W Bush to let the then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, to realise that he had a choice to either cooperate with America or be prepared to be bombed, “back to stone age”, after the September 11 attacks. His fellow party man and Republican Presidential nominee, Donald Trump, also shares the preference for more basic instincts and bluster, over glib talk.

Clearly, the more relevant manoeuverings and strategic decisions are rooted in talks, without the glare of the media, anchors and ‘experts’. The US offer to extend sensitive military technology and hardware to India, the decision by the US to block the sale of F-16s to Pakistan etc. fructify after focused bilateral engagements and strategic alignments (which can be either circumstantial or instigated). All superlatives of ‘friendships’ and otherwise, have no supporting linear equation or logic. As Henry Kissinger once famously noted, “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.” This holds true for the large-hearted support China extends to its “all weather friendship” with Pakistan.

It is the necessiy of dynamic geopolitical churning that either draws two nations towards each other, or otherwise. A certain transactional quid pro quo is inherent for say, a tiny island nation in the Pacific, to support the candidature of India in the permanent seat at the UN, or for voting in favour of India on a contentious resolution. This transactional largesse can take the form of an economic commitment, infrastructural grant or any other form of benefit accruing to the supporting party.

Geopolitically and economically, India is irreversibly poised to be the preferred partner of the Western bloc given its politico-cultural sensibilities of secularism, participative democracy and the accompanying unrestricted economy. This is coupled with the geographical attraction of proximity to the biggest headache of the West in the 21st century, i.e. China. However, ambiguity of words will continue to dominate in the medium term as the Americans have solid compulsions, geographical imperatives and strategic assets deployed on Pakistan soil to support its commitments in landlocked Afghanistan.

So, while the official American initiative will continue to test the diagnosis of the American-English in both Islamabad and Delhi, such fora as the UN and ASEAN will invariably couch their wordplay in utopian terms. The current semantic quibbling emanating from the UN Headquarters will be of no real relevance when India actually decides to articulate its concrete response to Uri and to the multiple other wounds inflicted on it by Pakistan. Multilateral fora are increasingly becoming economic or security ‘clubs’ instead of being platforms for deliberation, discussion or dispute resolution. Clearly, ‘bilateralism’ and not ‘internationalism is the way forward.