The death-rattle of the indigenous MBT Arjun is now audible, the Army has little faith in its “promoters” presenting anything better than the cumbersome monstrosity for which it had placed limited orders under unlimited political duress. That is the upshot of the Army inviting proposals from foreign and domestic industry to manufacture “Future Ready Combat Vehicles” – which, junk the fauji jargon – is a replacement for the Soviet-era T-72 tanks.

Once the mainstay of the “cavalry” they are now ready to be put out to pasture. It would be premature to speculate on the response or how long, despite the “make in India” mantra, it will take for a new tank to churn up the dust. However the clear signal is that there is no confidence in the so-called Arjun Mk-II meeting the military&’s requirements. And that despite the huge financial and allied investment and the prolonged patience of the Army, the Defence Research and Development Organisation and the Ordnance Factory Board have simply failed to deliver.

That the monopoly of the public sector was under threat was evident when even the “socialist-minded” former defence minister (AK Antony) cleared the Navy&’s proposal to  place orders on private shipyards for auxiliaries, and more recently Hindustan Aeronautics was excluded from the project (won by Tata-Airbus) for a replacement for the IAF&’s HS-748 transports. And recall that Dassault&’s disinclination to collaborate with HAL was one stumbling block in the original Rafale deal. The story is near-complete, the conclusion inevitable – the “self-reliance” dream will have to be drastically re-configured if the sarkari sector is to retain its place as the major supplier of equipment to the armed forces: at least of high-value, advanced equipment.

The bell tolling for the MBT Arjun could actually open fresh avenues to the Ordnance Factories provided they unshackle themselves from decades-old thinking, re-work themselves to function in a competitive environment that admittedly is very different from the monopolistic, captive market situation in which they have wallowed in mediocrity. The tank proposal is not “closed” to them, they have the land, facilities and experienced work-force that favours a tie-up with a foreign principal. Yet the management will have to liberate itself from bureaucratic fetters and the workers move on from their traditional trade union tactics that were politically pampered. The domestic private sector is on an upswing but yet to acquire the myriad assets of the Ordnance Factories, Defence PSUs and the DRDO which did the “thinking” but lacked commercial capabilities. “Privatisation” remains a dirty word, but since Modi-sarkar claims it will abandon red tape for red carpet (in terms of industrial collaboration), the higher management of the defence industry could also be revamped, rendered “professional.”