Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had said in March 2015 that he was giving himself three months to create the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). He said: “Integration has to be there and Chief of Defence Staff is a must. How do you work it out? Give me some time and I will work it out because the three forces’ integration does not exist in the present structure.”

One year after the minister accepted the need for defence reforms, there has been no forward movement. Meanwhile, President XI Jinping of China has undertaken bold reforms of the PLA&’s command structure, including the setting up of five new “battle zones” to undertake integrated joint operations.

After the Kargil conflict, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had appointed a Group of Ministers (GoM) to study the Kargil Review Committee&’s report and recommend measures for implementation. The GoM recommended sweeping reforms to the existing national security management system. The CCS accepted all its recommendations, including one for the establishment of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). In addition, the CCS approved implementation of the following key measures:

• Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was established with representation from all the Services.

• The Andaman and Nicobar Command and the Strategic Forces Command, both tri-Service, were established.

• The tri-Service Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established under the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) for strategic threat assessments.

• Speedy decision-making, enhanced transparency and accountability were sought to be brought into defence acquisitions. Approval of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP 2002) was formally announced.

• The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) was set up for gathering electronic and other technical intelligence.

• The CCS also issued a directive that each of India&’s land borders with different countries will be managed by a single agency like the Border Security Force. The concept of “one border, one force” was adopted.

• The CCS nominated the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) as India&’s primary force for counter-insurgency operations. This experiment has not yet fully succeeded as the CRPF is taking inordinately long to settle down in its new role.

• The establishment of a National Defence University was approved.

Despite the new measures approved for implementation by the CCS on 11 May  2001, many lacunae still remain in the management of national security. In order to review the progress of implementation of the proposals approved by the CCS in 2001 and to take stock of the new developments over the last 10 years, such as the threats emanating from the sea a la the Mumbai terror strikes and the rapid deterioration of the regional security environment due to the advent of the Islamic State militia, the growing spread of radical extremism and creeping Talibanisation, the government appointed a new Task Force on National Security in mid-June 2011, led by Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary.

The Naresh Chandra committee urged the government to ensure adequate military preparedness to deal with growing threats and challenges, including a militarily more assertive China. By far the most salient recommendation of the committee was to appoint a permanent Chairman of the present CoSC, that is, another four-star post in addition to the army, navy and air force chiefs of staff. This falls well short of the inescapable operational requirement of appointing a CDS and simultaneously creating integrated theatre commands for joint warfare in future conflicts. While a permanent Chairman of the CoSC will certainly be able to better coordinate the modernisation plans of the three services and improve the management of tri-service institutions than a rotating Chairman, he will have no role to play in integrating operational plans for joint warfare.

The committee also recommended the creation of three new tri-Service commands to better manage future challenges and vulnerabilities. These included a Special Operations Command, an Aerospace Command and a Cyber Command. Other recommendations of the committee included the establishment of a Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs to deliberate on security issues having foreign policy implications, the setting up of an Advanced Projects Agency under the Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister to oversee defence research and development (R&D), and the posting of additional armed forces officers to the MoD and the MEA and civilian IAS officers to the services HQ for better integration and coordination. The committee had also recommended an increase in FDI in defence joint ventures from 26 to 49 per cent; this has been implemented.

The government must immediately appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The logical next step would be to constitute tri-Service integrated theatre commands to synergise the capabilities and the combat potential of individual Services. It is time to set up a tri-service Aerospace and Cyber Command as well as a Special Forces Command to meet emerging challenges in these fields and to better manage all available resources. A tri-Service Logistics and Maintenance command has also been long overdue.

International experience suggests that structural reform in the defence sector has to be imposed with a top-down approach and can never work if the government keeps waiting for it to come about from the bottom-up.

Certain measures are imperative – Formulation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), after undertaking a strategic defence review; the immediate appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff to head the defence planning function and provide single point military advice to the Cabinet Committee on Security; approve  LTIPP 2007-22, the long-term integrated perspective plan of the armed forces and the ongoing five-year Defence Plan 2012-17, now in its fourth year;  the defence budget must be enhanced in stages to 3. per cent of the GDP for meaningful defence modernisation and for upgrading the present military strategy of dissuasion against China to deterrence; the  long-pending defence procurement plans such as C4I2SR, artillery modernisation, the acquisition of MMRCA fighter aircraft, aircraft carriers and submarines must be hastened; modernisation plans of the central paramilitary and police forces must also be given the attention they deserve; anomalies created by the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Pay Commissions have led to a civil-military divide and must be redressed early, including acceptance of the ex-Servicemen&’s legitimate demand for one rank-one pension (OROP); and a national War Memorial must be constructed at a suitable high-visibility spot in New Delhi to honour the memory of all those soldiers, sailors and airmen who have made the supreme sacrifice in the service of India.

The writer is former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.