David Coleman Headley&’s latest deposition via video-conferencing from an undisclosed location in the US has further exposed the algorithm of modern-day terror networks and the need to pre-emptively decode and decipher the threat warnings. Modern-day spycraft is an ongoing tryst of ‘hits’ and fatal ‘misses’, not an exact science but more of an art of connecting the disparate dots and pulling together of all leads and strands to put in place possible and plausible scenarios.

The complexity isn’t just in keeping pace with the obvious technological ‘deflectors’, but is one of sharing timely consolidated inputs, from the multitude of specialized agencies both in the country, and externally with the other global intelligence platforms. Terror dimensions have a pan-continental presence and capability with infrastructure and financial assistance that are geared to be the proverbial and deadly ‘one-step-ahead’ to effect the requisite strike and damage.

It is said that the Mumbai plot of 26/11 was individually tailed by the intelligence agencies of the US, the UK and India; however, each of the agencies was unaware of the overlapping efforts and terror assessments of the other. It was a classic case of an inability to put the entire picture together.

They were bits and pieces that could have been spilled  only  when  the  attack  started.  An  unaligned network is not always accidental, as often intelligence  agencies  with vested national interests may tend to be economical with the truth.

David  Headley  is  suspected to be a double agent with allegiance to the CIA, even as he was complicit in planning the terror attack with the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan. This is symptomatic of the cross-wiring in international snooping networks.

However, technology can piece together facts retrospectively, as it did in 26/11. The footprints led them back to the protagonists in Pakistan, thereby ensuring the diplomatic and moral high ground for India, vis-a-vis Pakistan, irrespective of the lackadaisical follow-up by the Pakistanis. It reconfirmed the Indian narrative of the vexatious  Pakistani  power  structure  and  its  overt/covert handiwork  in  shady  and  questionable  initiatives  across borders.

The lessons of 26/11 were not just imbibed by Indians, but the ultra-secretive approach of the US government of keeping the Pakistani government in the dark, while ‘taking out’ Osama bin Laden from the garrison town of Abbottabad is a pointer to the trust-deficit that exists, even in the Pentagon. American security-paranoia was tasted by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who discovered that even her phone was tapped by the US and she retorted, ‘spying between friends, that&’s just not done’!

Today  official  patronage,  support  and  training  by ‘rogue nations’ or agencies have taken the sophistication to unprecedented levels. It is a threat to the capabilities of individual  nations  to  withstand  such  technological advancement and subterfuge, individually. However, snooping on electronic data and communication platforms is de rigueur;  the  trickier  part  is  to  sift  through  the  same, analyse the data, and formulate a cohesive line of thought. Such concepts as ‘sleeper cells’ and ‘suicide’ attacks have added  further  complexities  and  enhanced  the  damage-capability.

Intelligence is inherently ‘iffy’ (may-happen-or-may-not-happen), given the playing field. There is another reverse tendency of ‘blanket warnings’ that can have an impact on the country&’s defence reaction-abilities. At the field level, the combat units to negate the threats are distinct and different from the intelligence setups like RAW, IB, NTRO or the Intelligence Units of the Armed Forces or the police.

There are specialized anti-terrorist units like the NSG, GARUD or MARCOS, as also the conventional bulwark of the security apparatus, namely the BSF or SSB and the Army. Besides the obvious challenge of aligning the inter-agency webs towards concerns like ensuring that no blame is pointed at any particular agency, there is an unfortunate tendency to generalize threats without specifics or adequate information for counter-terror initiatives. Yet it may be seemingly sufficient to secure the ‘tick in the box’ for ‘warning was issued’, by the intelligence agencies to avoid the government&’s censure or reprisals.

This ‘covering of the track’, is like the proverbial wait-for-the-wolf calls (blank calls), that often lull the frontline troops to lower their guard and pay the price for that one incident that does slip through, owing to the lack of conviction in the persistent wolf calls, that do not differentiate between the quantum or credibility of threat perceptions. Threat perceptions are never always accurate; however, like the ‘miss’ of 26/11, even the quantum of wolf calls ought to reflect on the individual/institutional evaluation of performance. The combat arms are forever at the receiving end of generic threat perceptions.

Consolidating the intelligence apparatus via a separate internal security ministry is imperative. Joining the international intelligence highway of other nations, however prudent, will require the inputs of the National Security Adviser to buttress conventional diplomacy as part of international relations.

While Pathankot was not fully overlooked from an intelligence perspective, the scale and composition of the terrorists was not known till the end of the operation. Questions have been raised in terms of operational command and the type of force. The idea is to determine the future terror protocols and procedures.

Terror threats are not unidimensional or symmetrical; such a threat is a cat-and-mouse game in which the agencies have to be ahead of the technological and planning framework and capabilities of the terror outfits. Also, countries which betray a higher level of sensibility in the policing apparatus (e.g. Israel) can cope better with providing invaluable inputs to the police to minimize the security threats. India suffers with low public-police empathy and therefore the network system is not very responsive and receptive to preempting any incident.

It allows an adequate incubation period and cover for the  terror  potential  to  unintentionally  progress,  till  it  is too late to avoid the disaster. Lastly, the quintessential Indian  approach  of  ‘politicising’  terror  incidents  with  an  eye  to  secure  electoral  brownie  points  can  affect  the security systems and future terror deterrence. Apart from the stakeholders concerned, no terror/disaster “tourism” by the political leaders in the affected area should be allowed.

Terror  management  requires  specialists  to  decode and decipher threat perceptions with optimum accuracy and minimum distraction. Socio-economic diversity, TRP-led media and the political considerations often obfuscate and  mire  what  is  already  a  very  entangled  task  for  any country in the world to second-guess, fast and accurately enough.

The writer is Lt Gen PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands & Puducherry.